I just finished Baghdad at Sunrise by Colonel Peter Mansoor. The book is primarily a personal account of his deployments to Iraq. However, at one point the Petreus COINista digresses into a discussion on the myth of humanitarian neutrality in modern warfare:
“[After the bombing of the UN compound in Iraq on September 22, 2003] … The implications were clear. The insurgents and terrorists viewed any organization that was helping to stabilize the situation — whether ostensibly neutral or not — as aiding what they deemed to be an illegal occupation. … Although U.S. soldiers had at one time barricaded the access road adjacent to the Canal Hotel [site of the UN compound], the obstacles were removed at the behest of UN personnel, who were uneasy with the highly visible military presence. Ultimately, the assumption and appearance of neutrality provided no barriers to insurgent attacks. The rising vulnerability of international and nongovernmental organizations in the world today is an unfortunate fact. In a world of failed states, global terrorist movements, and progressively more virulent religious dogma and extremist ideologies, civilians and those who support them are increasingly targeted for political advantage, and emblems such as the UN globe and the Red Cross no longer confer immunity from attack. After the departure of most UN personnel, NGOs became the next target — but they, too, failed to heed the lesson of this bloody reality.”
Mansoor is partly correct. Humanitarian neutrality is a myth, but this is neither a new development or caused by “failed states, global terrorist movements, and progressively more virulent religious dogma and extremist ideologies”. During the Spanish-American war, the admittedly yellow-journalist Davis Crane observed that Spanish sharpshooters “spared neither the wounded nor recognized the Red Cross, they killed the surgeons and the stewards carrying the litters, and killed the wounded men…” (Cirillo 2004, 119). On the flip side, before their fall, the extremist and dogmatic Tamil Tigers allowed the Sri Lankan government to run hospitals in Tiger controlled territory. Attacks on humanitarians are out of strategic and tactical opportunity. Rebels, regardless of dogma and ideology, are outnumbered and outgunned. They attack what they can get away with. If the biggest vulnerable targets are humanitarians, and killing humanitarians does not threaten the terrorists sources of economic support, they might very well be inclined to attack.
Work Cited:
Cirillo, Vincent J. 2004. Bullets and Bacilli: The Spanish-American War and Military Medicine. Rutgers University Press.
Christopher R. Albon is a political science Ph.D. specializing in armed conflict, public health, human security, and health diplomacy.
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