From April 1775 to March 1776 the Continental Army lay siege to British forces in the town of Boston. The eleven month siege resulted in a major victory for George Washington’s scrappy army. Boston’s geography (a peninsula connected to the mainland by a narrow isthmus) is often credited for the lack of an early decisive engagement during the siege. The physical terrain worked against the attacker in any potential maneuver. However, some recent histories highlight another reason for the long stalemate: smallpox.
Smallpox flourished during the war. The highly virulent disease spread rapidly as soldiers on both sides clustered in unsanitary camps. The incidence was fueled by the steady supply of new recruits with no previous exposure. One early report in the war claimed that between 30-35% of Washington’s troops were sick (not always smallpox) and unfit for duty (Becker 2004, 393).
Washington’s army was especially at risk from smallpox. While African Americans, Native Americans, and British troops commonly inoculated themselves to smallpox, American colonists widely scorned the practice. The inoculation procedure required the application of pus from a smallpox pustule onto the skin of an non-immune individual. Many New England colonist considered the practice repulsive — even blasphemous — and enacted heavy legal restrictions against it. As a result, Washington had great difficulty inoculating his troops and his army was perpetually at risk of debilitating smallpox epidemics within their ranks.
Historians debate why the British commander, General Howe, failed to fortify the Dorchester Heights, which overlooked his besieged town. While most historians blame the personal failings of Howe, Ann Becker argues that the epidemiological terrain made Howe consider a Continental offensive unlikely. During the siege, Washington commented in letters that smallpox existed throughout Boston and British troops inside the city were thoroughly inoculated. The Continental general considered smallpox “a weapon of defense they are using against us” and a “surety against any attempt of ours to attack” (George Washington to John Hancock and George Washington to Joseph Reed, both quoted in Becker 2004, 399). Any attack on Boston would expose the Continental Army to smallpox in Boston, giving the inoculated British troops a significant advantage. Thus, General Hume — surrounded by a smallpox epidemic — felt secure from Continental attack.
Work Cited
Becker, Ann M. 2004. “Smallpox in Washington’s Army: Strategic Implications of the Disease during the American Revolutionary War.” The Journal of Military History 68(2): 381-430.
Christopher R. Albon is a political science Ph.D. specializing in armed conflict, public health, human security, and health diplomacy.
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This post has been linked for the HOT5 Daily 10/06/2009, at The Unreligious Right
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