Last week on ForeignPolicy.com, Human Rights Watch Director Kenneth Roth proposed something that left me rather speechless: a jungle war.
Obama needs to put this principle into practice, and there is no better case for the humanitarian use of force than the urgent need to arrest Joseph Kony, the ruthless leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), and protect the civilians who are his prey. And far from requiring a non-consensual intervention, Kony’s apprehension would be welcomed by the governments concerned. …
In May, Obama signed a bill committing the United States to help arrest Kony and his commanders and protect the affected population. Now it is high time to act. Arresting Kony would reaffirm that mass murder cannot be committed with impunity. And it would show that, despite the difficulties in Iraq and Afghanistan, the humanitarian use of force remains a live option at the Obama White House.
I like and respect Human Rights Watch, but Roth’s plan is ill-advised. Don’t get me wrong, Joseph Kony is Africa’s Hitler, but sending US forcing into an unforgiving jungle to find and battle a rebel groups with intimate knowledge of the terrain is a recipe for disaster.
After personally experiencing America’s failure in Vietnam and success in the Gulf War, the much respected General Colin Powell proposed a series of questions that must all be answered with “Yes” before the United States engages in military action. These questions came to be known as the Powell Doctrine:
- Is a vital national security interest threatened?
- Do we have a clear attainable objective?
- Have the risks and costs been fully and frankly analyzed?
- Have all other non-violent policy means been fully exhausted?
- Is there a plausible exit strategy to avoid endless entanglement?
- Have the consequences of our action been fully considered?
- Is the action supported by the American people?
- Do we have genuine broad international support?
Despite massive changes in the international environment during the last two decades, I still believe with much of the Powell Doctrine. Despite some flaws, it is an excellent yardstick to measure the appropriateness of putting US armed forces and civilian populations at risk. So, when I saw Roth’s proposal I immediate asked myself what would the Powell Doctrine say:
1. Is a vital national security interest threatened?
Yes. While the Lord’s Resistance Army is not strong enough to threaten the governments of Uganda, Democratic Republic Of The Congo, Sudan, or the Central African Republic, the rebel group does pose a very real risk to the not-yet-established country of South Sudan. South Sudan represents a major potential ally for the United States in the region and its survival is an important national security interest.
2. Do we have a clear attainable objective?
No. Roth argues the purpose of the US intervention would be the arrest of LRA leader Joseph Kony. However, there is no reason to believe his arrest alone would have a crippling impact on the rebel group. In fact, a “humanitarian use of force” to arrest him would, almost inevitably, expand into a full-scale counter-guerilla campaign against the Lords Resistance Army, an action history shows to have no clear end point.
3. Have the risks and costs been fully and frankly analyzed?
No. The operation would likely entail deploying tens thousands of infantry soldiers to chase rebels with decades of local knowledge across terrain that negates the advantage of American airpower. This is a recipe for disaster, or at least significant casualties. For an idea of what I am talking about I recommend reading up on France’s experience in Indochina
4. Have all other non-violent policy means been fully exhausted?
Yes. There is no reason to believe Kony is ever going to surrender on his own.
5. Is there a plausible exit strategy to avoid endless entanglement?
No. See question 2.
6. Have the consequences of our action been fully considered?
Not yet, but we cannot blame Roth for not doing so in the few hundred words allotted to him.
7. Is the action supported by the American people?
No. After a decade of brutal and arguably unnecessary wars, there is absolutely no way the risking of American lives to protect civilians in the jungles of central Africa is going to be supported by the electorate.
8. Do we have genuine broad international support?
Probably not. The international community supports the arrest of Joseph Kony in theory, but I doubt this support would continue once the US proposed what is necessary to do so: a large scale air and ground campaign involving tens of thousands of American soldiers, thousands of private contractors, hundreds of airstrikes, and maybe even airborne defoliants.
In conclusion, the use of military force is unjustified and inappropriate, regardless of the brutality of Kony and the Lord’s Resistance Army.
Christopher R. Albon is a political science Ph.D. specializing in armed conflict, public health, human security, and health diplomacy.
Want more? Subscribe to Conflict Health through RSS or email.
{ 2 trackbacks }
{ 20 comments }
A large, protracted military operation? I think not.
One Ranger battalion should be all that’s needed, as opposed to the 50-division straw-man-scenario presented above. They could be dropped in for a three or four-month campaign without most of the American electorate knowing.
A single battalion would require little in the way of logistical support compared to conventional forces. They can be supplied from the air. Their use poses little risk of a quagmire scenario, as has been presented in exaggerated terms above. Highly trained soldiers operating with unconventional (non-frontal) tactics are at less risk of getting hurt or killed than conventional forces.
Unlike the First Indochina War, the United States would find local support to help rid the region of the LRA. Let us remember that the winners of the First Indochina War used American weapons that were generally superior to the hodgepodge available to the French.
Nobody else can do this job. The nearest French forces in the region (2nd REP) are overstretched and are neither trained nor equipped for this type of operation.
The LRA has been supported by the Sudanese PLA, which in turn has been supported by the United States. We helped create this mess. It’s our responsibility to put an end to it.
The human suffering caused by the LRA stands to continue unabated unless the United States acts. This is precisely why we have a military: to protect innocent civilians. African civilians shouldn’t count for less than people elsewhere.
Anthony, that last assertion is pretty questionable. The US military exists to defend the US, not to “protect innocent civilians” wherever they may be. I’m with you in agreeing that the LRA is absolutely horrible, but it’s not at all clear that it’s either the US responsibility or in the US interest to deal with it. Members of the all-volunteer US army promise to “will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign or domestic.” It’s not at all clear that the LRA is actually a threat to the US or its Constitution, and to ask people to risk their lives for something that they didn’t sign up to defend is a very serious matter.
Also, it would take a lot more than a lone Ranger battalion to take down Kony. He’s crazy, but he’s also a brilliant tactician. And he has a HUGE advantage in terms of knowing the territory, being able to supply his men with basically nothing, and his experience in avoiding capture for so long.
If, as asserted above, the US military exists to protect the US, then I fail to see the Constitutional justification for the invasions of the Dominican Republic, Panama, Grenada, or the occupation of the Philippines. Realpolitik perhaps, but then realpolitik could be used to argue for the elimination of the LRA.
Treaty obligations have often been used to justify interventions, as with the Britain’s declaration of war against Germany following the latter’s invasion of Poland.
In realpolitik terms, regardless of what the Constitution states, the United States is the world’s policeman. Otherwise we would not need such a large military.
Was it a mistake for the US to abstain from military intervention against genocide in Rwanda? The Powell Doctrine would argue no, even as the US president at the time now says it was a mistake.
I would respectfully argue against the assertion above that a single Ranger battalion would be insufficient against the LRA. In third-world conflicts, the presence of a single, more advanced weapon system can dramatically alter results on the ground.
The absence of night fighting equipment, proper communications gear, or AC-130 gunships puts Uganda’s armed forces roughly on par with the LRA on a man-to-man basis. The presence of those elements by a small number (400) of US forces would be a true game-changer.
The mental health of the LRA’s supremo is not a factor. Their best defense would be to disperse, which renders them less destructive and more amenable to survivors being addressed by local forces.
I also thought the Roth piece bizarre, and incredibly under-argued. But your post strikes me as weird, too:
Right off the bat, you (or Powell) and Roth are at odds: He explicitly proposed a humanitarian use of force, and the first criterion of the Powell Doctrine is national interest. Maybe you/Powell assume that national interest is a fair criterion (a fair primary criterion, even) for the humanitarian use of force, but I would find that difficult to buy. Though there’s certainly a trend toward costuming the call to use force with “rational” (self-interested) arguments — “All conflict is global; saving people is not a matter of being the right thing to do, it’s a matter of protecting our national interest in the long run” — I’m not ready to call any decision about the use (or non-use) of force that starts with the objective, “Is it in our vital national interest” a humanitarian choice. But I could just be old-fashioned.
Hey Jina,
To clarify, I did not intend to suggest that the Powell Doctrine’s first criteria was in any way related to humanitarianism, rather simply the use of force in general. Put rather simply, I do not believe different criteria should be used to justify the “the use of force” and “the humanitarian use of force”. They both use the same criteria is my book.
Thanks, Chris. But tell me more about that: Why does a humanitarian use of force require a national security justification? And what then makes it “humanitarian” and not just like any other use of force? I think I’m trying to put two and two together here but I keep getting 5.
Hey Jina,
“Why does a humanitarian use of force require a national security justification?”
Because I believe humanitarianism is not justification for a unilateral, international use of force. I reject that humanitarianism is a legitimate reason to start armed conflict. The only legitimate reason to use force is national security, hence my reference to the Powell doctrine.
So the humanitarian-ness of it is irrelevant then, right? Which brings me back to the Powell/Roth apples/oranges (or maybe tangerines/tangelos) problem. But one follow up: Would you agree or disagree with justifying a multi-lateral use of force for humanitarian motives (irrespective of the fact that the UN/IC thinks it does this regularly — let’s talk normative here)?
“So the humanitarian-ness of it is irrelevant then, right?”
For justifying the unilateral use of force? Yes. It is not apples vs. oranges because it is the same force.
“Would you agree or disagree with justifying a multilateral use of force for humanitarian motives?”
This is where it gets murky. I agree with multidimensional peace operations, but not peace enforcement. I have no problem with peacekeepers attempting to capture Kony or protect civilians, but a peacekeeping force is very different than a military force, and special forces in particular.
Okay, so let me put it this way: You simply don’t admit the possibility of a humanitarian military operation of the type Roth kind of, sort of alluded to, which I would guess is why it’s apples:apples to you. But someone who did admit into the conversation the possibility of a humanitarian use of unilateral force could see apples:…something else, anyway.
I would guess — big emphasis on those two words — that the difference between a PKO and a military force or special forces is exactly Roth’s point. I think his is a variation on the “just send in the contractors!” argument we sometimes see about DRC, one which presumes that the failures of one kind of force can be avoided, and (simultaneously) more efficient action undertaken, by sending in a different kind of force.
To be clear, I don’t think Roth’s idea is promising…. though I don’t know if sending MONUSCO or UNAMID after Kony is, either.
“You simply don’t admit the possibility of a humanitarian military operation of the type Roth kind of, sort of alluded to, which I would guess is why it’s apples:apples to you.”
I certainly admit the possibility of unilateral humanitarian uses of force, but I do not believe they are justified, or a good idea.
Very thoughtful analysis Chris. One of the major roadblocks I think preventing peace in the region is the lack of media attention. Many people I feel don’t know about or fully understand the suffering going on there. While there is celebrity activism, I feel that documentaries and movies could be the most effective way of raising awareness. The Devil Came on Horseback was a really eye opening documentary and the movie Attack on Darfur should be as well. Hopefully people will see it and be inspired to take action. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1pQqoVhb7m4
The analogy to the French experience in Indochina is bizarre — that was a colonial war with a vastly different historical context. Besides, the LRA is estimated to have less than 500 “fighters” at the moment, and no real popular support in any of the countries in which it operates. How much historical research have you done on the LRA, or are most of your assertions here based on analogies drawn other African (or “Third World”) conflicts? A number of Ugandan journalists and researchers would vehemently disagree with your strategic assessments about the difficulty of apprehending Kony at the current moment. Not all interventions are intractable — even in the “jungles of Africa.” Of course, this doesn’t justify Roth’s initial argument in FP, but you (like him) seem to be offering up claims based on analogy, rather than analysis.
Also, just reading through your back-and-forth with Jina — the idea that unilateral humanitarian intervention is illegitimate is a fair argument to make. But it’s a detailed argument that you, indeed, will have to make — and haven’t made here, aside from just asserting your normative beliefs. Am very interested in hearing more.
Hi Elizabeth,
“The analogy to the French experience in Indochina is bizarre — that was a colonial war with a vastly different historical context. Besides, the LRA is estimated to have less than 500 “fighters” at the moment, and no real popular support in any of the countries in which it operates.”
My reference to the French Indochina was not addressing the probability a success at the operational level, but that tactically operations in jungle terrain negates many the advantages of modern militaries (armor, airpower, etc…) and hence produces more casualties… i.e. costs.
“A number of Ugandan journalists and researchers would vehemently disagree with your strategic assessments about the difficulty of apprehending Kony at the current moment.”
And a number of military officers and experts would vehemently disagree with the Ugandan journalists and researchers. I am confused with your argument here.
“Also, just reading through your back-and-forth with Jina — the idea that unilateral humanitarian intervention is illegitimate is a fair argument to make. But it’s a detailed argument that you, indeed, will have to make — and haven’t made here, aside from just asserting your normative beliefs.”
This is very true, it was a blog comment not a detailed analysis.
Cheers!
Ahhh… well, given the time that you spent going back and forth with Jina about the issue, I had hoped that you might expand upon your beliefs somewhat. Especially since such beliefs seem to form the foundation for your discontent with certain interventions (like those advocated by Roth). Hopefully, at some point you will take the time to expound upon your ideas so that others can better grasp the points you’re trying to make.
I’m curious: which military strategists with expertise in the the Great Lakes region have declared the LRA to be too difficult to touch? This is news to me.
And just a geographical point of fact: the areas in which Kony et al are operating these days — eastern CAR, Darfur, South Sudan — are far from any “jungle terrain” comparable to (19th and early-to-mid 20th century) Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia. Kony’s current neighborhood certainly does not comprise areas that would negate the advantages of U.S. armor or airpower — what analyses are you drawing on? Moreover, from a historical perspective, many things have changed militarily since the French were fighting their colonial wars in Indochina. With due respect, those sweeping kinds of claims about military strategy sound woefully naive. And unhelpful to the very real policy and security quandaries that beset this region of the world.
“Hopefully, at some point you will take the time to expound upon your ideas so that others can better grasp the points you’re trying to make.”
Good idea! I’ll make a point of it!
“I’m curious: which military strategists with expertise in the the Great Lakes region have declared the LRA to be too difficult to touch? This is news to me.”
Sorry Elizabeth, just for clarification, which Ugandan journalists and researchers with expertise in US military operations have declared the LRA easy to defeat? I would be really interested in reading that.
“And just a geographical point of fact: the areas in which Kony et al are operating these days — eastern CAR, Darfur, South Sudan — are far from any “jungle terrain” comparable to (19th and early-to-mid 20th century) Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia.”
I have never visited the LRA’s area of operations, so my knowledge naturally comes from external sources. In 2010 the following sources described the LRA as operating in a jungle:
News24: http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/S-Sudan-to-arm-militia-against-LRA-20100927
The Guardian: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/mar/31/congo-massacre-jungle-lra
The Independent: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/the-lords-resistance-armys-new-reign-of-terror-2051298.html
PRI’s The World: http://www.theworld.org/2010/03/29/the-lords-resistance-army-in-congo/
All these references came from a two minute Google search. There is no lack of scholarly references as well.
“Kony’s current neighborhood certainly does not comprise areas that would negate the advantages of U.S. armor or airpower.”
Julia Spiegel of the Enough Project would disagree with you: http://bloggingheads.tv/diavlogs/17021?in=13:43&out=17:06
Cheers
my friend,
if you get your information on the current geography of the LRA from two-minute google searches, I now understand your misapprehensions. a couple final points:
1. the editorial writers at the guardian (and these other mags you’ve cited) aren’t experts in the region. for someone who lives in RSA, you should be familiar with the misallocated adjectives that europeans apply to various areas of the continent. the fact that someone in the popular press described the LRA’s (current) terrain as a “jungle” doesn’t make it so.
2. the geography of eastern congo is not the same as the geography of western and southern sudan (or northeastern CAR). read some of the articles to which you linked above — a couple of them are referring to operation lightening thunder, which took place in garamba park, DRC. kony is not there anymore, and hasn’t been for a while.
3. spiegel’s bloggingheads discussion also refers to kony’s congolese hide-out. (point of fact: john prendergast’s minions at Enough are hardly known for their policy acumen. be careful about citing that research group as an authoritative source.)
4. for someone who knows so little about the current whereabouts and regional politics of the LRA, the certitude with which you write is surprising. and disappointing, especially for someone like yourself, who one day hopes to make his career in the academy.
good luck to you, bud.
peace,
Elizabeth
Oh brother, Elizabeth. I have approached our discussion with genuine desire to reach some sort of greater truth through dialog. You’ve pushed me to defend and refine my position, and I hope I have done the same for you. However, many of your comments appear to be driven out of a curious desire to “win the argument” or take little jabs at me. Please understand that passive-aggression benefits nobody, there is no golden ring to claim here.
Anyway, no worries. I hope we meet again someday on better terms!
Cheers,
Christopher
Utilizing military forces for Humanitarian purposes does not have to mean limited conventional war in fact preserving the peace and preventing such an escalation is even more important. Haiti is a prime example of US Joint forces providing Humanitarian Aid quite effectively when they needed it most. The US Military has come a long way since the jungle war in Vietnam and a lot has changed in how we train to fight and how our government decides to employ our forces.
During Stability Operations, engagement and intervention activities are better defined in terms of the progress toward stabilizing the operational environment. This defines the environment according to two quantifiable, complementary scales: decreasing violence and increasing normalization of the state, the fundamental measures of success in conflict transformation. This provides a means with which to gauge conditions of an operational environment, formulate an engagement methodology, and measure progress toward success.
Military forces can engage at any point along this spectrum. In each case, achieving the end state requires quickly reducing the level of violence while creating conditions that support safely introducing other government agencies and intergovernmental organizations while securing critical humanitarian access for nongovernmental organizations. Military operations focus on stabilizing the environment and transforming conditions of the environment and the state toward normalization. As conditions of the environment begin to improve, the constructive capabilities of military forces focus toward building host-nation capacity and encouraging sustained development.
Special Operation Forces (SOF) in Civil Affairs (CA) perform stability operations and support full spectrum operations in every environment across the spectrum of conflict, from stable peace to general war. They are essential to the conduct of successful stability operations. CA personnel provide unique area and linguistic orientation, cultural astuteness, advisory capabilities, and civilian professional skills that generally parallel those of host-nation governments. Essentially they work with the host nation to assist them in executing the mission. The Iraqi Security Forces are a prime example of these types of operations.
The US Army has proven itself for over two centuries at conducting conventional warfare throughout the world but offensive and defensive operations aren’t just for warfighting anymore and the U.S. Army is now taking the lead to integrate and utilize stability operations as doctrine requiring commanders to utilize these tools to support the spectrum of conflict as a new way to fight and win. The experiences of most US combat units in Iraq are helping to change the traditional mind set, as are initiatives directed by the Department of Defense and the Chief of Staff of the Army. And as the types of conflicts we face continue to change so shall the US Army.
As for the international community supporting the arrest of Joseph Kony, well that would be pure conjecture, that part of the world is full of bad guys and I don’t think anyone would complain if we were able to assist the government in ending his reign of terror. The use of military force is not unjustified and inappropriate if it is utilized appropriately, I’m sure the people experiencing the brutality of Kony and the Lord’s Resistance Army wouldn’t mind either.
Greg
Hi Greg,
Great, great reply: clear, concise, strong. Would you mind if I published your comment in its entirety as its own post where more people could see it?
Cheers!
Chris
Comments on this entry are closed.