The Department of Defense is releasing a new handbook [pdf], but inside you will not learn how to transport a tank, plan an ambush, or jump out of a C-130. Instead, this publication is “a primer for the military about private, voluntary, and nongovernmental organizations operating in humanitarian emergencies globally”. In other words, “humanitarians 101”.
The guide is meant to help familiarize servicemen on the in’s and out’s of NGOs, in turn promoting amicable relations between the two, which have traditionally varied between mild curiosity to outright hostility. The guide’s eighteen chapters cover the gambit of NGO topics from “What is an NGO?”, to non-profit bureaucracy, to humanitarian logistics, to international NGO coordination, to physical security. Overall, the primer offers a fair and largely positive assessment of NGOs and their capabilities, portraying them as nimble, creative if underfunded groups and the “the driving force in deploying humanitarian assistance programs”. Where NGOs stumble says the primer, is logistics and large-scale operations. The most NGOs lack the capacity to manage large, international movement of goods and equipment. Limited resources force NGOs to use off the shelf transportation solutions, cheaper but often unreliable in emergencies. Second, the limited resources of NGOs prohibit most from running country-size programs. While there are coordinating bodies, the fragmented nature of the greater humanitarian community means that “[no] matter how much coordination occurs, NGOs are still individual entities, often both small and private, that act independently during emergencies”, preventing unified, cohesive action.
The primer offers lengthy discussions of ‘typical’ NGO personnel. To its credit, it counters the long held stereotype of aid workers as unprofessional do-gooders, observing that “[t]he days of witnessing untrained and young ‘humanitarians’ attempting to get involved are not over, but now more than ever value is placed on professional operations, experience, protocol, training, and capacity to handle extremely technical tasks in difficult working environments. Advanced degrees and program specialties are major rank indicators and most NGOs found operating in humanitarian emergencies can be trusted to meet their objectives”. NGO personnel are portrayed as professional, experienced and independent. They are free agents operating in a loose organizational structure, “often tasked with responding to the needs of NGO beneficiaries before that of the NGO”. Yet, while highlighting the independent nature of humanitarians, the guide cannot resist offering a laughable guide to the aid worker ‘uniform’:
“That is, there is no easy way to identify NGO personnel. Instead, and to generalize grossly, many NGO personnel wear what has become seemingly if informally standard — multi pocketed vest (normally tan or black), khaki pants, chukka boots, and sometimes a badge with an ID card or insignia. Medical personnel often wear or tote fanny-packs filled with essential tools or medicines, and engineers and logisticians often carry small tool belts.”
Where the guide does falters is in local NGO personnel. Local aid workers are only briefly discussed, yet play a major and growing role in NGO operations. Locals are often hired for their ability to move and operate amongst the population (i.e. no fanny-packs). Thus, in many cases they will be the primary points of contact in the field.
The last chapter contains the primer’s core message: that there are areas of potential, value-added cooperation between humanitarians and the militaries. Specifically, the military can support NGO operations by offering physical security, logistical capacity, and communications. In those three areas the military’s capacity dwarf those in the NGO sector. The primer also explains NGOs reluctance to work with the military, highlighting the value of the USAID OFDA as a civilian middleman between the two sides. NGOs are not going anywhere. The number of humanitarian groups has skyrocketed since World War II. In the foreseeable future, the military is going to have to work closer with NGOs, whether during combat operations in Central Asia or disaster relief in the Caribbean. This new primer is both an acknowledgment that NGOs cannot be ignored and an argument for greater cooperation.
You can download a pre-release draft here [pdf].
Christopher R. Albon is a political science Ph.D. specializing in armed conflict, public health, human security, and health diplomacy.
Want more? Subscribe to Conflict Health through RSS or email.
Comments on this entry are closed.