In the 1960s, political scientist Kenneth Boulding argued that military power was depleted by geographic distance. The cost of logistics and long range weapon development meant that most states are exceptionally limited in their ability to project power. In other words, Belize has little to fear from Mozambique’s military power. Called the loss of strength gradient, Boulding’s theory refined how global strategists thought about power. Last week, Halvard Buhaug published a brilliant extension of Boulding’s theory by applying loss of strength gradients to civil wars (unfortunately it is gated):
“I argue that a significant factor influencing the location of civil wars relative to the capital city is the power distribution between the state and the non-state actors. In countries where the state is strong—typically in institutionally consistent and wealthy regimes—or the rebels are very weak, emerging conflicts are likely to occur in the remote periphery. Weaker states pose less of a threat to armed non-governmental groups and may not be able to exert force outside urban areas, so in such countries the battles are expected to take place closer to the state’s home base.” (Buhaung 2010, 108)
Here is a quick graphic I created demonstrating Buhaug’s theory:
Buhaug’s paper is no less than a first attempt to predict the areas of a country most likely to be affected by political violence. Developed more, the theory could help the international community identify regions most at risk during intrastate armed conflict. I am looking forward to see how this vein of research pans out.
Christopher R. Albon is a political science Ph.D. specializing in armed conflict, public health, human security, and health diplomacy.
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Hey Chris – not having read the piece (as it gated), some obvious question arise from your post – does the piece focus only on situations where an insurgency has already established a territorial base? Or does it focus on identifying areas that are most likely to become territorial bases for insurgencies and then estimating likely insurgent strength based on available appropriable resources to determine likely zones of competition? If the former, then I not sure we will learn much that is new – it is also worth noting that insurgents often prove quite effective in moving to areas where the state is weaker in response to state clampdowns – hence the ‘whack a mole’ problems of counter insurgency…
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