Earlier this month, the Economist reported that regimes from around the world had been visiting Sri Lanka to learn from the country’s successful hard power strategy against the Tamil Tigers:
Louise Arbour, head of the International Crisis Group (ICG), says the Sri Lanka model consists of three parts: what she dubs “scorched-earth tactics” (full operational freedom for the army, no negotiations with terrorists, no ceasefires to let them regroup); next, ignoring differences between combatants and non-combatants (the new ICG report documents many such examples); lastly, the dismissal of international and media concerns. A senior official in President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s office, quoted anonymously in a journal, Indian Defence Review, says “we had to ensure that we regulated the media. We didn’t want the international community to force peace negotiations on us.” The author of that article, V.K. Shashikumar, concludes that “in the final analysis the Rajapaksa model is based on a military precept…Terrorism has to be wiped out militarily and cannot be tackled politically.” This is the opposite of the strategy America is pursuing in Afghanistan. It is winning a widespread hearing.
First, as a side note, Sri Lanka’s strategy was not “scorched earth”. Scorched earth involves destroying items useful to the enemy during a withdrawal, not launching a military campaign with an open ROE (rules of engagement).
Second, more to the point, one wonders what lessons can truly be learned from Sri Lanka. Being an avid West Wing fan, there is a phrase from the show I could not get out of my head while watching the brutal final campaign play out on the island nation. A White House deputy is arguing for a new aggressive Middle East doctrine with a Congresswomen. When she challenges the new hardline approach he replies: “They’ll like us when we win”. This phase is the true lessons learned from the Sri Lankan endgame. It is not about “scorched earth”, but that a quick end justifies the means.
Third, there is no guarantee the Sri Lankan victory is permanent. It would not surprise me at all if LTTE had reformed itself five years from now, manned by civilians radicalized by the Sri Lankan government’s tactics. This new LTTE would likely be more brutal and hardline than his predecessor. Sri Lanka might have won the war, but it lost the people. Ten years from now, they will realize the full cost of doing so.
Christopher R. Albon is a political science Ph.D. specializing in armed conflict, public health, human security, and health diplomacy.
Want more? Subscribe to Conflict Health through RSS or email.
Comments on this entry are closed.